Research Catalog

Title

Learning to eat soup with a knife : counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam / John A. Nagl ; with a new preface by the author ; foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker.

Author

Nagl, John A., 1966-

Publication

Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Description

xxix, 249 p. : ill.; 23 cm.

Summary

Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq, considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl, the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass, argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency.

Uniform Title

Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Alternative Title

Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Subjects

• 1948-1975
• Vietnam War > (1961-1975)
• Malayan Emergency > (Malaya : > 1948-1960)
• History
• United States > Army > History > Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975
• Counterinsurgency > Vietnam
• Great Britain > Army > History > Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
• Counterinsurgency > Malaysia > Malaya
• Malaya > History > Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
• Vietnam War, 1961-1975 > Underground movements

Genre/Form

History

Note

• Originally published: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002.

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (p. [227]-243) and index.

Processing Action (note)

• committed to retain

Contents

pt. 1. Setting the stage. How armies learn -- The hard lesson of insurgency -- The British and American armies: separated by a common language -- pt. 2. Malaya. British army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan emergency, 1948-1951 -- The empire strikes back: British army counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 -- pt. 3. Vietnam. The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the advisory years, 1950-1964 -- The U.S. army in Vietnam: organizational culture and learning during the fighting years, 1965-1972 -- pt. 4. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Hard lessons: the British and American armies learn counterinsurgency -- Organizational culture and learning institutions: learning to eat soup with a knife.

ISBN

0226567702 (pbk. : alk. paper)

LCCN

^^2005008015

OCLC

• 58595108
• SCSB-12133538

Owning Institutions

Harvard Library