Research Catalog

Title

Classical indian philosophy of mind : the Nyāya dualist tradition / Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti.

Author

Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar.

Publication

Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Press, ©1999.

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Details

Description

xx, 309 pages; 23 cm

Summary

"This book examines psycho-physical dualism as developed by the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy. Dualism is important to many world religions which promote personal immortality and to morality which promotes free will. For the Nyaya, the self is a permanent, immaterial substance to which non-physical internal states like cognition belong. This view is challenged by other Indian schools, especially the Buddhist and Carvaka schools." "Chakrabarti brings out the connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the mind-body problem and shows that the Nyaya position is well developed, well articulated, and defensible."--Jacket.

Subjects

• Ātman
• Nyaya
• Nyāya

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (p. 293-303) and index.

Contents

Outline of Nyaya ontology -- outline of Nyaya epistemology -- the principle of general acceptability of inductive examples (GAIE) -- brief history -- work plan -- Understanding Nyaya-Vaisesika Dualism -- The defining property of being physical -- Nyaya dualism distinguished from Cartesian dualism -- the self is neither devoid of extension nor essentially conscious -- the issue of psycho-physical interaction -- an empiricistic approach to dualism -- Cognition -- Classification of cognition -- fluidity of qualificand-qualifier distinction -- layered-ness of cognition -- the objection from an explanatory gap to the thesis of identity of cognitive states with brain states -- memory -- doubt -- erro -- dream -- Other Internal States -- Pain and pleasure and why they are different -- desire -- aversion -- the limitation of the exclusively neuro-scientific approach for an understanding of internal states -- reply to the charge of mysterianism -- The Existence and Permanence of the Self -- Six signs of the self offered by Gotama -- the Buddhist no-self theory -- the argument from memory and how each of the six signs involves memory as shown by Vatsyayana -- personal identity cannot be grounded in a flowing stream of causally connected states: the arguments of Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra -- the Humean view -- objection to the Humean view -- Parfit's view and its refutation -- the James-Flanagan view and its critique -- The Self as a Substance -- Vatsyayana's argument for the self as a substance.

ISBN

• 0791441717
• 9780791441718
• 0791441725
• 9780791441725

LCCN

98047027

OCLC

• ocm40113453
• 40113453
• SCSB-9439186

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library