Research Catalog
The Tet offensive : intelligence failure in war
- Title
- The Tet offensive : intelligence failure in war / James J. Wirtz.
- Author
- Wirtz, James J., 1958-
- Publication
- Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1991.
Items in the Library & Off-site
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1 Item
| Status | Format | Access | Call Number | Item Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Text | Use in library | DS559.8.M44 W57 1991 | Off-site |
Details
- Description
- x, 290 pages : maps; 25 cm.
- Summary
- "In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response."--Back cover.
- Series Statement
- Cornell studies in security affairs
- Uniform Title
- Cornell studies in security affairs
- Subjects
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 277-283) and index.
- Contents
- PART 1. "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK": 1. The Communist debate over strategy ; 2. Plans, preparations, and objectives of the Tet Offensive -- PART 2. THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE: 3. The sources of American biases ; 4. Missing the signals: July-November 1967 ; 5. Missing the signals: December 1967-30 January 1968 ; 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive -- Conclusion: Explaining the failure of intelligence.
- ISBN
- 0801424860
- 9780801424861
- 0801482097
- 9780801482090
- LCCN
- 91055048
- OCLC
- ocm23767295
- 23767295
- SCSB-14472308
- Owning Institutions
- Princeton University Library